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Abstract 
 
Movement attributes shape the relative effectiveness of violent and nonviolent tactics. We show 
how nonviolent tactics can be relatively more effective when a movement can mobilize more active 
participants than with violence. A nonviolent mobilization advantage requires a large potential 
audience; movements with limited mobilization potential can have feasible prospects for violent 
dissent and a nonviolent mobilization disadvantage. We examine the implications of the model 
against empirical data for different types of dissident tactics and on resort to nonviolent and 
nonviolent dissent. We demonstrate very different actor profiles in nonviolent dissent and violent 
conflict, and the two types of dissent are more likely under distinct settings. Although tactics reflect 
choices, movement attributes and constraints will tend to give a comparative advantage to one over 
the other. Movement characteristics thus fundamentally guide choices in dissent, and this has 
important implications for assessing the impact of different types of dissent and likely outcomes. 
 
 
Keywords: conflict, nonviolence, violence, mobilization; JEL D72, D74, D79 
 
Acknowledgments: The authors are listed in alphabetical order, equal authorship implied. We are 
grateful for funding from the Research Council of Norway (275955/F10) and the European 
Research Council Conflict (313373). We are indebted to helpful discussion, comments, and 
suggestion from Henrikas Bartusevicius, Erica Chenoweth, Stephanie Dornschneider, Felix Haass, 
Cullen Hendrix, Gabriel Leon, and Reed Wood. 
 
 
  
3 
Introduction 
The Arab Spring of 2011 illustrates how dissident mobilizations employ non-violent and violent 
tactics. Whereas a mainly nonviolent movement brought down Ben Ali in Tunisia, in Libya Gaddafi 
was toppled through violence. Syria has descended into a major civil war where the government has 
gradually won the upper hand. Several scholars argue that nonviolent movements offer important 
strategic advantages over violent movements, increasing the likelihood of success.1 Chenoweth and 
Stephan find that nonviolent campaigns succeed about twice as often as violent campaigns. They 
attribute this to nonviolent campaigns possessing a mobilization advantage over violent campaigns. 
However, it does not follow that such a mobilization advantage is universal. If factors shaping the 
ability to mobilize also influence the prospects for success, we must look beyond observed tactics 
and outcomes and consider how the ability to mobilize guides the choice of strategy. We argue that 
different movements are likely to have a comparative advantage in one tactic over another, and the 
expected ex ante prospects for success will steer the choice of strategy. 
We develop a model of strategic choice for dissident tactics, emphasizing the potential for 
mobilization. Every movement has a potential audience, and its size caps the maximum mobilization 
potential. Movements that focus on the interest of a small population (e.g., secession for a minority) 
will have a smaller potential base than movements with a wide audience (i.e., removing a near 
universally unpopular government). We show that under very general conditions, dissident 
movements with higher mobilization potential (i.e., larger audiences and resources for mobilization) 
are likely to have an advantage in nonviolent tactics over violent tactics, since they can mobilize more 
active participants under nonviolent strategies. By contrast, movements with a limited audience are 
                                                 
1 Chenoweth and Stephan (2011); Rivera and Gleditsch (2013). 
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unlikely to have a sufficient nonviolent mobilization advantage, and may see violence as the best 
option. The model underscores how large-scale nonviolence can be more successful than violent 
dissent, but also how only certain movements can expect to do well using a nonviolent strategy. 
Movements with limited mobilization potential are unlikely to improve their position by switching 
from violent to nonviolent tactics. The model helps to illustrate scope conditions for when movements 
are likely to choose a nonviolent or violent strategy based on expected success. Only by taking this 
selection process seriously can we fully understand how tactics may influence outcomes. Indeed, 
violence is a likely adaptation to a low mobilization potential, and more likely when prospects for 
concessions are limited. 
We compare the implications of the model against data on nonviolent and violent 
mobilization. Active participation is much higher in nonviolent campaigns than violent rebellion, and 
nonviolent movements also have a larger target audience and plausible resources for mobilization. 
Nonviolent dissent is also more likely in urbanized non-democracies, where it is easier to mobilize 
large numbers of disaffected individuals, while violence is more likely in non-democracies with 
larger rural populations. Ethnic movements become relatively more likely to use nonviolence the 
larger the ethnic group. 
 
Nonviolent and violent dissident tactics 
Many empirical studies equate conflict with the use of violence, but definitions of conflict tend to 
emphasize the incompatibilities between actors.2 An incompatibility can motivate specific actions 
such as resort to violence, but violence is just one response, and actors can also challenge a state 
                                                 
2 See Boulding (1963, 5); Most and Starr (1989). 
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using many forms of nonviolent direct action.3 Violent and nonviolent dissent have often been studied 
in isolation of one another.4 Studies of violent conflict often disregard all variation outside violence, 
which can include both active nonviolent dissent as well as an absence of incompatibilities. Studies 
of nonviolence often focus only on active cases, without accounting for initial onset or comparisons 
with potential use of violence.5 Likewise, many studies compare outcomes across active violent and 
nonviolent campaigns, without attention to the initial tactic choice.6 
Some research privileges agency, and argues that any group can choose nonviolent tactics.7 
                                                 
3 See Bond (1994); Sharp (1973). We focus on nonviolent direct action that is convention-breaking— 
as opposed to routine politics within an established legal framework — and with maximalist claims 
against the government. Research on armed civil conflict normally focuses on organized violence 
with a maximalist incompatibility (either government or territory), excluding other forms of violence 
such as interpersonal violence, crime, or riots without organization, see Gleditsch et al., (2002); 
Kreutz (2015). Many “not-violent” activities fall outside direct action, as they are conducted within 
routine politics, or do not seek to topple the government. 
4 Schock (2013). 
5 E.g., Burrowes (1996); Sharp (1973); Wehr, Burgess and Burgess, (1994). 
6 E.g., Chenoweth and Stephan (2011); Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013). Chenoweth and Lewis 
(2013) provide an illustrative effort, emphasizing how common predictors of civil war do not predict 
to nonviolent campaign onset. Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) focus on out-of-sample prediction of 
nonviolence, and less about when violence and nonviolence may be more likely. Cunningham (2013) 
studies tactics among ethnic separatist groups, and does not consider non-sectarian direct action. 
7 Schock (2005). 
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Others emphasize strict sequencing in tactics, and see nonviolence as a precursor to violence, either 
as a means to mobilize for violence or as activist become disillusioned with ineffective nonviolent 
dissent.8 Movements may substitute violent for nonviolent tactics whenever one tactic proves to be 
unsuccessful,9 but substitution is a second-order issue compared to accounting for initial tactic choice. 
Existing data suggest that initial strategic choice tends to be stable, and that substitution is the 
exception rather than the rule. In the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Dataset 
(NAVCO), fewer than 10% of the campaigns in independent states change strategy.10 
What may account for initial strategy choice? We answer this question using a simple model 
of nonviolent and violent coercion technologies, where a movement’s potential resources for 
mobilization and constraints can provide a comparative advantage to one tactic over the other. 
Nonviolence is relatively more effective when a movement can mobilize a sufficiently larger number 
than they can realistically enlist in armed struggle. In contrast, violent challenges remain feasible 
even when movements have limited mobilization potential and ability to coerce governments through 
nonviolence. In short, nonviolence is effective precisely when actors can mobilize many more people. 
This contradicts the belief that violent challenges are more threatening to the incumbent regime and 
that nonviolent tactics is mainly a weapon of weak actors, unable to mount a violent rebellion.11 
                                                 
8 Haines (1988); Regan and Norton (2005); Tarrow (1994). 
9  Lichbach (1987); Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley (1983). 
10 We list all campaigns with apparent shifts in the Appendix. Many reflect the emergence of new 
primary organizations, and there are even fewer examples where a specific organization changes 
tactics. García-Ponce and Wantchékon (2020) also note a strong separation between violent and non-
violent African independence movements. 
11 E.g., Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2018, 7): “. . . popular uprising is a tactic chosen by groups that 
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Factors such as motives, audiences, and resources will determine the potential nonviolent 
mobilization advantage and the relative effectiveness of violent and nonviolent tactics. Actors choose 
the tactics they believe are most likely to be effective based on the given constraints. As key 
circumstances rarely change after the initial choice, tactics in conflict tend to be stable absent external 
shocks, as actors are unlikely to be able improve their situation by unilaterally changing tactics. 
We use a bargaining framework to illustrate potential differences in tactic effectiveness. 
Figure 112 represents conflict between a dissident group i and the government j over a continuous 
incompatibility [0, 1], e.g., relative political influence. The dissident group i prefers a division x closer 
to 0, while the government j prefers an outcome closer to 1. The relative power of the actors p is 
scaled so that higher values indicate a stronger government relative to the dissident group. p can be 
interpreted as contest success function or the fraction won in a confrontation.13 When the status quo 
q is far from the relative power p, as in Figure 1, dissidents may try to challenge the state. 
 
Figure 1: Bargaining and conflict 
 
Standard applications of bargaining models treat “war” as a costly non-agreement option, but 
a contest could rely on a range of tactics. In this framework, any difference between nonviolent or 
violent dissent must be reflected in either the relative power p or the costs of confrontation C. We 
                                                 
lack the organization and resources to maintain insurgency . . . ”. 
12 Adapted from Fearon (1995). 
13 Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009; Hirshleifer, 1988. 
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delineate different production functions for relative power pn in a direct confrontation using 
nonviolent tactics and pv using violent tactics, with individual participation or mobilization m as input. 
In the next section we detail how the relative effectiveness of violent and nonviolent tactics pv and pn 
will vary if tactics have different maximum achievable mobilization 𝑚  and 𝑚 . 
In essence, nonviolent conflict requires high active participation to be effective, whereas violent 
conflict can be feasible and have some impact despite limited participation. But even if we make a 
conservative (and questionable) assumption that violent tactics are always more effective than 
nonviolence at any fixed number of active participants, nonviolent tactics can still be relatively more 
effective if a movement has a sufficiently large mobilization advantage using nonviolent over violent 
methods. However, since the minimum participation threshold for imposing substantial costs on the 
government is likely to be much lower for violent than nonviolent tactics, violent tactics will be 
relatively more attractive for groups with a small audience.14 
 
                                                 
14 Others propose alternative formal frameworks of tactic choice. DeNardo (1985) treats mass 
mobilization as a function of distance to individual ideal points, where people participate when 
movements choose a platform closer than government policy. More complex extensions introduce 
costs of participation (particularly with respect to mobilization under repression), and suggest that 
movements with low support may choose violence to increase pressure. However, there is no explicit 
comparison of violent and nonviolent tactics, group characteristics, or systematic empirical 
evaluation. Bhavnani and Jha (2014) propose a model where a government faces higher costs in 
repressing a nonviolent than a violent movement, due to sanctions by international audiences, but do 
not explicitly discuss if mobilization may vary by tactics. 
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Power by tactics and maximum mobilization 
Figure 2 provides a stylized representation of how relative power pv (solid black line) and pn (dashed 
grey line) changes by mobilization m. Recall that p is scaled so that values closer to 0 indicate stronger 
dissidents, since dissidents maximize probability of success in 1 − p. Figure 2 is drawn so that violent 
tactics are always relatively more effective than nonviolent tactics at any specific level of 
mobilization m. The gap is larger when mobilization is low, but nonviolent tactics become gradually 
more effective with higher mobilization. A tactic is only feasible if a group can mount sufficient 
participants to achieve some non-negligible impact. In Figure 2, a violent confrontation has a non-
trivial impact pv even with low participation m, whereas pn remains close to 1 (i.e., complete 
government predominance) when m is low. 
  
10 
Figure 2: Relative power p by mobilization m and tactic 
 
Note: p indicates the relative power of government-to-dissidents, and relative dissident power 
1 − p is decreasing in p. 
 
Figure 2 reflects the uncontroversial claims that nonviolent tactics with low participation will 
have limited coercive power,15 while even relatively small violent movements can be costly for 
governments and difficult to defeat conclusively.16 Dissidents can overcome a small size 
disadvantage through covert action (making it difficult to target participants) or choosing “soft” 
targets (for example civilians rather than well-protected official targets), and aspire to grow through 
                                                 
15 Chenoweth and Stephan (2011); DeNardo (1985); Kuran (1989). 
16 Arreguin-Toft (2001); Butler and Gates (2009). For example, the terrorist campaign of the Greek 
Revolutionary Organization 17 November – with only 20 active participants (Corsun, 1992) – is 
estimated to have decreased foreign direct investment and tourism revenue by about 12% (Enders 
and Sandler, 1996). 
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the attention generated by attacks.17 Nonviolent direct action from below can primarily be effective 
when it is public, and active participants expose themselves to potential retaliation. However, the risk 
to individual participants decreases and effectiveness increases when mobilization m is substantial.18 
Several successful nonviolent campaigns have mobilized more than 100,000 participants.19 
We now proceed to how maximum achievable mobilization m can differ by tactic. Chenoweth 
and Stephan suggest that nonviolent movements have a general mobilization advantage since they 
can enlist more participants than violent campaigns.20 Violent conflict has high initial recruitment 
costs, as preparing individuals for effective combat requires substantial training and equipment. This 
limits the numbers that can be recruited at the outset, and it will take time to convert potential recruits 
to skilled soldiers. For example, the 1944 Warsaw uprising in Poland had more active insurgents (ca 
500,000) than the relatively small local German forces, but was unable to convert troop superiority 
into effective military power, due to a lack of arms and training. Moreover, the individual opportunity 
costs for participating in violence are often high, since active participation is difficult to combine 
with civilian life and employment, further suppressing voluntary recruitment. By comparison, 
nonviolent action has lower barriers to participation, with few if any requirements for training, and 
campaigns can in principle quickly mobilize participants. Likewise, the opportunity costs tend to be 
lower than for armed conflict, and participants can often switch between activism and civilian lives. 
                                                 
17  Bapat (2005); Beardsley, Gleditsch and Lo (2015). 
18  DeNardo (1985); Kuran (1989); Sharp (1973). 
19  Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). 
20 Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). 
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In sum, the maximum achievable m can be much higher for nonviolent than violent tactics.21 
We argue that a mobilization advantage sufficient to improve the relative power p ultimately 
depends on the maximum feasible mobilization, contra Chenoweth and Stephan. Movements differ 
in audience or potential, and can only be more effective using nonviolence n when they can mobilize 
sufficiently more active participants using nonviolence compared to violent tactics. Figure 3 
compares two movements with a large audience (left) and a limited audience (right). In the left panel 
(a) maximum mobilization with nonviolence 𝑚   is sufficiently large relative to maximum 
mobilization with violence 𝑚   to make 𝑝 𝑝  so that the group is more effective using 
nonviolent tactics. However, if there is a sufficiently low ceiling on 𝑚 , then a larger maximum 
mobilization than 𝑚  does not by itself yield a non-violent mobilization advantage. In the right 
panel (b), nonviolent tactics have a comparative disadvantage over violent tactics, even though 
maximum mobilization is much larger. We provide a simple general proof of the proposition that 
mobilization beyond a critical value will give a higher probability of success for a nonviolent strategy 
than for a violent strategy in the Appendix. This does not assume a specific functional form, and only 
requires that the probability of success rises with greater dissident mobilization and declining 
marginal gains, and that maximum mobilization for the movement using nonviolence is greater than 
for violence. 
 
                                                 
21 Participation in nonviolence can be fickle, especially since organizations can rarely reward or 
control individual participants. Violent groups can often reward individual participants and punish 
defection, see Bhavnani and Jha (2014); Gates (2002). This helps to account for why violent conflicts 
tend to last longer than nonviolent campaigns. 
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Figure 3: Relative power p by maximum mobilization mmax  for tactic n, v 
 
   (a)      (b) 
 
Group characteristics and tactical choice 
We can now relate dissident movement characteristics to the choice of tactics. Our model shows that 
a nonviolent mobilization advantage requires a large potential audience, and with a low ceiling on 
 𝑚  nonviolent tactics will have a comparative disadvantage, making dissidents more likely to 
choose violent tactics. These implications for likely tactic choices can be evaluated against observed 
conflict profiles and the attributes of a potential movement. 
The underlying incompatibility and specific claims of a movement will define its potential 
audience.22 Mobilization can also differ if individuals have preferences over tactics, for example if 
some potential participants do not support violent tactics or sensitive to the costs of violence. If so, 
achievable violent mobilization 𝑚  will be capped at a lower level than mobilization using 
nonviolent tactics 𝑚 . Finally, resources shape the share of the audience movements can 
                                                 
22 Buhaug (2006); Sobek and Payne (2010). 
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mobilize.23 A movement with greater resources for eliciting individual participation is more likely to 
have a mobilization advantage in nonviolence. For example, it is easier to organize nonviolent dissent 
in a large urban population with greater individual skills and endowments, and violent conflict is 
more common in the periphery with low human capital.24 
Actual mobilization depends on many factors beyond the potential, including ideology, leadership, 
and the state’s ability to preempt or deter. Still, we can derive many propositions on differences in 
conflict movements from our simplified model. First, since the potential audience is larger, 
nonviolent action should be more likely for challenges over the government than secession, where 
the appeal is bounded to a distinct ethnic group.25 Efforts to change the government must appeal to a 
large audience and attempt to convert government supporters, making violence more likely to prove 
counterproductive and alienate potential supporters. 
Second, movements that have more resources are more likely to have nonviolent mobilization 
advantage. Individual and community resources facilitate particular types of collective action. We 
expect movements to have a nonviolent mobilization advantage in urban societies with greater 
individual skills and collective resources facilitating nonviolent mobilization and where states are 
more vulnerable to disruptive activities. Small and resource poor movements have limited ability to 
impose significant costs through nonviolent protest and are more likely to perceive better prospects 
through violent rebellion. 
Third, movements that can mobilize throughout a country have better prospects for nonviolent 
                                                 
23  McCarthy and Zald (1977). 
24  García-Ponce and Wantchékon (2020); Thyne (2006). 
25  Cunningham (2013, 2014); Cunningham, Dahl and Frugé (2017). 
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tactics, whereas movements confined to the periphery are more likely to choose violent tactics. 
Conflict location reflect in part objectives; separatists groups tend to focus on a claimed homeland 
and normally have limited interest and capacity to act elsewhere.26 Nonviolent challenges to the 
government are unlikely to have much impact unless they engage the capital and major cities. Anti-
government mobilization is effective for urban movements that can mobilize in the capital and large 
cities. Moreover, we should see a higher share of nonviolent conflicts extending over large areas and 
including capital cities when resources and mobilization spread out.  
In active conflicts — as assumed by a binary choice bargaining framework — we can directly 
assess differences in actor profiles and tactics. For the initial decision to actively use tactics vs 
inaction we must also account for incompatibilities and consider the full population of potential 
action. To look at potential motivation, we assume that all dissent is motivated by grievances arising 
from political marginalization.27 The lack of political access in a non-democracy can motivate direct 
action against dictatorial governments.28 Democracy does not by itself mean that people will not have 
grievances, but we are less likely to see direct action, or large discrepancies between the status quo q 
and the relative power of actors p when participation is open and voting actually matters. 
 
Empirical evaluation 
We now consider model implications against empirical data on movement characteristics and distinct 
types of mobilization. We first look at the characteristics of violent and nonviolent movements. 
                                                 
26  Beardsley, Gleditsch and Lo (2015). 
27 E.g., Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013). 
28  Muller and Weede (1990); Rivera and Gleditsch (2013). 
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Second, we look at patterns of onset for both types of mobilization for country profiles, and how this 
varies by plausible motives, audiences and resources. Third, we look at data on self-determination 
groups where we can explicit consider the potential audience size. The evidence is consistent with 
our claim that nonviolent mobilization is more likely when groups have feasible prospects for large-
scale mobilization. Thus, accounting for how plausible numbers shape initial tactic choice is essential 
to understand how strategies go together with outcomes in conflict. 
 
Movement characteristics 
We compare NAVCO 2.0 nonviolent campaigns with violent armed conflicts in the Uppsala Armed 
Conflict Data (ACD).29 We first compare the frequency of each type of mass mobilization across 
territorial and governmental incompatibilities.30 Figure 4 shows the number of violent (black 
                                                 
29 NAVCO focuses on nonviolent campaigns with maximalist claims and more than 1,000 
participants (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013), while UCDP armed conflicts must have more than 25 
battle-deaths per year (Gleditsch et al., 2002). NAVCO includes data on violent wars with more than 
1,000 battle deaths, but the apparent parallel between battledeaths and participants is misleading, 
since violent campaigns have more participants than battledeaths. NAVCO also reports campaigns 
taking place in countries before they become independent, for example former Soviet republics. We 
recode these as events in the independent state in existence when they take place. We remove the 
military coup d’etats included the ACD (i.e., coups that generate more than 25 battledeaths), as these 
arise from intra-elite government conflict rather than dissident mobilization (Powell and Thyne, 
2011). 
30 ACD distinguishes between territory and government, while NAVCO classify campaign aims as 
i) regime change, ii) significant institutional reform, iii) policy change, iv) territorial secession, v) 
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downward bars) and nonviolent (grey upwards bars) mobilizations for each incompatibility. We see 
notably more nonviolent than violent mobilization onsets for governmental incompatibilities, 
consistent with our claim that dissident groups with more encompassing claims and larger max 
mobilization m are likely to have a comparative advantage in nonviolent tactics. By contrast, 
territorial incompatibilities are more likely to see violent mobilization, in line with our claim that 
smaller secessionist groups are likely to have a comparative disadvantage in nonviolent direct action 
relative to violence. Indeed, we have only 13 NAVCO territorial nonviolent campaigns in sovereign 
states.31 
Figure 4: Conflict onsets by tactic and incompatibility 
 
   (a)      (b) 
 
                                                 
greater autonomy, or vi) anti-occupation. We consider the first three governmental incompatibilities 
and the latter three territorial incompatibilities. 
31 Five cases take place in the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia at the end of the Cold War. NAVCO 
codes Czechoslovakia 1968 and Hungary 1956 as responses to foreign occupation by the USSR, but 
both could arguably be considered anti-government. We provide a full list in the Appendix. 
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Figure 5 shows how active participation in nonviolent mobilization by far exceeds the number of 
participants in violent movements. The median participation rate for nonviolent campaigns is 
100,000, and 16 campaigns have more than one million participants. By contrast, the median rebel 
troop estimate in violent armed conflict is merely 4,000.32  This is consistent with movements being 
more likely to choose nonviolent tactics if they have large potential audiences and plausible 
expectations for large-scale mobilization.33 
 
  
                                                 
32 Civil wars that reach large participation often do so long after the initial onset, and under 
exceptional circumstances. For example, rebel troops peaked at 120,000 in Afghanistan, but this 
reflected massive external aid to build a mass army, and the rebels started with only about 4-5,000 
troops. See also Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009). 
33 Ethnic groups are rarely involved in mass nonviolent direct action, but those who do are on average 
much larger than the average groups in civil war—14.6 million vs 3.1 million, see Wucherpfennig et 
al. (2012). Cunningham (2013) finds that larger ethnic groups seem relatively less likely to use 
nonviolent direct action over conventional politics, but only compares against active movements, and 
also reports that large groups are more likely to be politically included. 
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Figure 5: Logged number of active participants by type of manifest conflict, median superimposed 
 
 
 
Finally, nonviolent and violent mobilization tend to take place in different locations. We 
classify whether NAVCO campaigns are a) limited or concentrated mainly in the capital, b) 
widespread throughout the entire country, or c) limited to the periphery. Figure 6 compares NAVCO 
locations with comparable information for violent campaigns, based on the Conflict Sites data.34 The 
mode for violent mobilization is fighting confined to the periphery. By contrast, nonviolent 
mobilization most often takes place in the capital or widespread throughout the country, and is rarely 
confined to the periphery. This is consistent with our claim that movements with an urban base are 
                                                 
34  Hallberg (2012). 
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more likely to choose nonviolent tactics while groups with lower resources and limited audiences are 
more likely to choose violent tactics and fight in the periphery. 
 
Figure 6: Location of manifest conflict by tactic 
 
 
We now assess resources for mobilization and the likely nonviolent mobilization advantage, 
using urban population size as proxy, based on data from UN population statistics. We find that 
nonviolent mobilization takes place in countries with larger urban populations, while civil wars occur 
in less urbanized countries. The median urban population in a country experiencing civil war is 5.23 
million, while the median urban population in cases undergoing nonviolent campaigns is 16.52 
million, over three times as large. 
Skeptics may wonder if these conclusions could be skewed by only looking at major conflicts 
and nonviolent mobilization with more than 1,000 participants. For this to be the case, the truncation 
21 
or exclusion of lower scale nonviolent events would have to be more severe than for violent events. 
But this does not appear to borne out by the existing data, as we have many more low-level violent 
events than nonviolent events below the participation thresholds. Using the Global Terrorism 
Database (1970-2016)35 for more encompassing data on intentions to use violence and the Social, 
Political, Economic Event Database (SPEED, 1945-2015)36 for civil unrest without a mobilization 
threshold, we find 2.3 more country-years with domestic violent attacks outside than inside civil wars, 
but only 2.1 times more country-years with civil unrest outside than inside NAVCO campaigns. This 
is not consistent with the conjecture that the apparent differences between nonviolent and violent 
mobilization events arise as an artifact due to selecting “larger” nonviolent events. 
 
Movement characteristics and initial mobilization 
We have seen above that nonviolent movements tend to have larger universal audiences, mobilize in 
capital and cities, and need more resources to facilitate mobilization. But if the likelihood of 
nonviolent mobilization is sensitive to expected dissident mobilization, then we should also see more 
observed inaction—or violent tactics—when the mobilization potential is low. 
 
 
Mobilization across country-level profiles 
Although it is challenging to identify potential movements ex ante,37 we can look at the likelihood of 
nonviolent mobilization across country-year profiles with measures reflecting potential motivation 
                                                 
35 LaFree and Dugan (2007).  
36 Nardulli, Althaus and Hayes (2015). 
37 Cunningham et al. (2017); White et al. (2015). 
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and resources for dissent.38 We assume that motivation for nonviolent direct action increases with the 
absence of democratic institutions. We use the full Polity institutionalized democracy scale and a 
dichotomous measure of non-democracy, flagging cases below 6.39 We proxy resources by the log of 
total urban population, using UN population division estimates. 
We consider some plausible alternative measures that could reflect resources for mobilization. 
Previous research argues that civil war is more likely in countries with larger populations. Indeed, 
some argue that incentives for conflict scale with country size.40 Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) 
suggest that nonviolent campaigns are more likely in countries with higher GDP per capita.41 We 
control for income and total population, which may be correlated with greater urbanization and 
government reliance on popular compliance.42 
We also control for other factors plausibly associated with both motivation and nonviolent 
dissent. We control for whether a country has one or more excluded ethnic groups in the EPR data, 
as ethnic exclusion increases the risk of civil war, and may be associated with political 
marginalization not captured by democratic institutions.43 Violent and nonviolent direct action are 
not mutually exclusive, and a country could experience both in the same year. Violence may crowd 
                                                 
38 This is comparable to Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch’s (2014) analyses of civil war. 
39 Jaggers and Gurr (1995). 
40 Alesina and Spolaore, (2003); Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
41 Chenoweth and Lewis (2013). 
42 Using data from Gleditsch (2002). 
43 Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch, 2014. 
23 
out nonviolence, and dissipate the mobilization advantage.44 We thus control for ongoing civil war. 
Finally, violent conflict has a strong tendency to recur, and we consider possible time dependence by 
counting time since a nonviolent campaign or independence, recorded back to 1900. Since time 
dependence is unlikely to be fully linear in years we take the log, adding 1 to the base. 
Table 1 presents a series of logit estimates of the onset of nonviolent action campaigns for 
different specifications. Model 1 uses the full Polity scale. We find that nonviolent campaign onset 
is less likely in more democratic countries, consistent with our claims about non-democracy as 
motivation and the plausible mobilization advantage of non-sectarian campaigns. In Model 2 we 
replace the graded Polity democracy measure with a binary measure, contrasting democracies and 
non-democracies. Non-democracies again are more likely to see non-violent campaigns, and our 
other results change little. Some have suggested that democracy will have an inverted U-shaped effect 
on dissent, with the highest mobilization in countries with sufficient motivation and opportunities.45 
In Model 3 we add the square of the Polity measure. We find no evidence for an inverted U-shaped 
relationship; the flex point is at -6, far from the middle, and the small change in the log likelihood 
provides little evidence for a non-linear relationship between the Polity scale and nonviolent 
campaigns. In Model 4 we use the tri-partite regime typology suggested by Jaggers and Gurr, and 
find no evidence that onset is more likely in anocracies than autocracies. 
The coefficient for ethnic exclusion in Model 1 is positive, indicating a higher risk of 
nonviolent campaigns when political systems discriminate against ethnic groups. But this reflects 
more non- sectarian mobilization in more exclusionary states rather than ethnic separatist 
                                                 
44  See also DeNardo (1985). 
45 Muller and Weede, 1990. 
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mobilization, since we have very few ethnic nonviolent campaigns. Moreover, the estimated 
coefficient for the binary non-democracy term in Model 2 is twice as large as the dichotomous ethnic 
exclusion measure. 
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TABLE 1: Nonviolent campaign onset 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Nonviolent campaign onset 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Civil war −0.285 
(0.295) 
−0.304 
(0.293) 
−0.262 
(0.294) 
−0.266 
(0.294) 
 
Exclusion 0.636∗∗ 0.600∗∗ 0.599∗∗ 0.582∗∗ 
 (0.252) (0.253) (0.252) (0.253) 
 
Polity −0.081∗∗∗ 
(0.018) 
 −0.085∗∗∗ 
(0.019) 
 
 
Non-democracy  1.337∗∗∗   
  (0.320)   
 
Polity2   −0.007∗ 
(0.004) 
 
 
Autocracy    1.463∗∗∗ 
    (0.327) 
 
Anocracy    0.986∗∗ 
    (0.395) 
 
Ln urban population 0.667∗∗ 0.636∗∗ 0.641∗∗ 0.666∗∗ 
 (0.279) (0.283) (0.285) (0.283) 
 
Ln population 
 
−0.242 
(0.285) 
−0.207 
(0.290) 
−0.213 
(0.291) 
−0.243 
(0.290) 
 
Ln GDP per capita 
 
−0.206 
(0.157) 
−0.187 
(0.161) 
−0.143 
(0.165) 
−0.195 
(0.161) 
 
Ln time at peace + 1 
 
−0.082 
(0.099) 
−0.061 
(0.099) 
−0.060 
(0.100) 
−0.073 
(0.100) 
 
Constant −6.503∗∗∗ 
(1.648) 
−7.626∗∗∗ 
(1.759) 
−6.720∗∗∗ 
(1.688) 
−7.420∗∗∗ 
(1.757) 
Observations 8,525 8,525 8,525 8,525 
Log Likelihood 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 
−420.725
857.450 
−421.716
859.432 
−418.966
855.932 
−420.326 
858.652 
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 
 
 
Turning to mobilization resources, we find these results to be in line with our expectations 
that nonviolent mobilization is more likely when there is a larger urban population and higher 
26 
capacity for collective action in cities.  
The coefficient for the log of urban population is positive and statistically significant. This 
contrasts with research on civil war, where larger total or peripheral population is associated with 
higher conflict risks. We find little evidence that either GDP per capita or total population display a 
clear relationship with the onset of nonviolent campaigns. Thus, there is no evidence that the effect 
of a larger urban population simply reflects larger or wealthier countries. The absence of a general 
impact of population size underscores our argument about relevant resources and the predominantly 
urban basis for nonviolent action.  
Finally, the coefficient estimate for ongoing civil war is negative, indicating that nonviolent 
direct action campaigns become less likely if there is a violent campaign in a country, although the 
coefficient is small and not significant. The coefficient for time since previous nonviolent campaign 
is also small and not significant, indicating little evidence of time dependence. 
One might argue that our propositions primarily pertain to nonviolent campaigns over the 
government. In Model 1 Table 2 we drop campaigns over territorial issues, but our results do not 
change notably. Model 2 shows that the results are similar for nonviolent campaign incidence, and 
thus not sensitive to the specific years assigned for onset or excluded years with ongoing campaigns. 
In Model 3 we replace nonviolent campaigns with violent civil conflict onset. The results are 
consistent with the idea that similar motives can spur different types of direct action — as seen by 
the positive coefficient for exclusion and negative coefficient for Polity — there are strong 
differences in the factors influencing opportunities. Indeed, the coefficient for urban population on 
violent conflict is negative. It remains negative (although not significant) in Model 4 restricted to 
only ethnic civil wars, where organizations make claims on behalf of distinct ethnic groups, based on 
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the ACD2EPR data,46 and Model 5 for civil wars over the government, which presumably resemble 
nonviolent campaigns over the government the most. 
Figure 7 displays predicted probabilities of nonviolent mobilization onset with error bars for 
profiles where countries are democratic or non-democratic and largely urban (70%) and rural (25%), 
based on the first and third quartile of the sample distribution and the estimates from Model 3, Table 
2, holding all other factors at the median. We see the highest likelihood of nonviolent campaign onset 
in urban non-democracies, where the predicted risk is twice as large as the risk in rural non-
democracies. Although the risk of nonviolent campaigns is higher with a larger urban population, the 
likelihood of a nonviolent direct action campaign remains low in a democracy. In sum, the likelihood 
of nonviolent mobilization is much higher in countries with a large urban population, while the 
predicted likelihood of a violent civil conflict is highest for a rural non-democracy. 
                                                 
46 Wucherpfennig et al. (2012). 
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TABLE 2: Alternative responses 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
 NVC onset (gov.) 
(1) 
NVC inc. 
(2) 
UCDP CW 
(3) 
Ethnic CW 
(4) 
Non-ethnic CW 
(5) 
Civil war, gov. −0.378 
(0.386) 
    
 
Civil war  −0.163 
(0.178) 
   
 
Nonviolent camp.   0.272 0.377 
 
0.155 
   (0.413) (0.559) (0.611)
 
Exclusion 0.522∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ 
 (0.261) (0.163) (0.200) (0.302) (0.263)
 
Polity −0.077∗∗∗ 
(0.019) 
−0.058∗∗∗ 
(0.011) 
−0.027∗ 
(0.014) 
−0.010 
(0.021) 
−0.033∗ 
(0.020) 
 
Ln urban population 0.578∗∗ 
(0.284) 
1.073∗∗∗ 
(0.191) 
−0.175 
(0.154) 
−0.210 
(0.221) 
 
−0.077 
(0.210) 
 
Ln population 
 
−0.205 −0.698∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗ 0.566∗∗ 
 
0.209 
 (0.293) (0.195) (0.171) (0.247) (0.232)
 
Ln GDP per capita 
 
−0.228 
(0.165) 
−0.160 
(0.103) 
−0.333∗∗∗ 
(0.125) 
−0.516∗∗∗ 
(0.189) 
−0.331∗∗ 
(0.162) 
 
Ln time w/o NVC + 1 
 
−0.039 
(0.104) 
−1.113∗∗∗ 
(0.054) 
   
 
Ln time w/o UCDP CW + 1   −0.479∗∗∗ 
(0.079) 
  
 
Ln time w/o ethnic CW + 1    −0.613∗∗∗ 
(0.111) 
 
 
Ln time w/o non-ethnic CW + 1     −0.228∗∗ 
(0.115) 
 
Constant −6.087∗∗∗ 
(1.736) 
−2.504∗∗ 
(1.092) 
−3.125∗∗ 
(1.258) 
−3.388∗ 
(1.873) 
−3.085∗ 
(1.661) 
Observations 8,584 8,700 7,495 7,428 7,436 
Log Likelihood −389.799 −766.008 −567.358 −287.088 −365.115
Akaike Inf. Crit. 795.597 1,548.015 1,150.717 590.175 746.231
Note:    ∗p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 
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Figure 7: Nonviolent campaign onset by country profiles 
 
 
 
Mobilization by type for self-determination groups 
Our country level analyses do not allow us to explicitly compare aggrieved group size and tactic 
choice. We provide additional analyses focusing on ethnic groups, where the size of the constituency 
is known ex ante. Although few ethnic movements engage in mass nonviolent direct action, 
organizations linked to self-determination groups often engage in lower-level mobilization and other 
activities that are not violent.47 The Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP) record violent and 
nonviolent activities by self-determination organizations. We expect ethnic movements to be more 
                                                 
47 Cunningham, Dahl and Frugé (2017). 
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likely to choose nonviolent strategies the larger the ethnic groups they claim to represent. 
Table 3 reports logit models for use of violent and nonviolent tactics in the SRDP for EPR ethnic 
group size estimates.48 The results indicate that the likelihood of any activity, both nonviolent and 
violent, increases with group size. However, Figure 8 shows that the likelihood of nonviolence 
increases much more rapidly with size than the likelihood of violence and is absolutely more likely 
for larger ethnic groups. These results suggest a positive relationship between Polity and nonviolence, 
but unlike the NAVCO data, the SRDP data are not limited to direct action and also include 
nonviolent routine political action. 
                                                 
48 Following Cunningham, Dahl and Frugé (2017) we control for Polity, GDP per capita, and imports 
as a percentage of GDP. 
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TABLE 3: Pr(tactic) by self-determination group size 
 
 
Pr(tactic) 
Violence >0 Nonviolence >0 
(1)  (2) 
Log group size 0.117∗∗∗  0.446∗∗∗ 
(0.027) (0.032) 
 
Imports as a percentage of GDP −0.009∗∗∗ −0.002 
(0.002) (0.003) 
 
Polity −0.008 0.054∗∗∗ 
(0.007) (0.008) 
 
Log GDP per capita −0.157∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 
(0.040) (0.045) 
 
Constant −0.027 −6.372∗∗∗ 
(0.393) (0.463) 
 
Observations 3,171 3,171 
Log Likelihood −1,961.120 −1,586.989 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,932.239 3,183.977 
 
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 
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Figure 8: Ethnic group size and nonviolent and violent tactics 
 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Nonviolent and violent mobilization can arise from similar motives but features that affect 
mobilization potential are likely to give a comparative advantage to one or the other tactic. 
Movements that aim at overturning dictatorships, have large potential audiences, and can mobilize 
many in key cities are likely to have a comparative advantage in nonviolent tactics. In contrast, 
movements that have a limited support base and core support confined to the periphery are more 
likely to have a comparative advantage in violence, and unlikely to be able to mount effective 
nonviolent mobilization. 
Our claims and findings challenge common tenets in conflict research. Many have argued that 
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violent rebellion will be used whenever feasible,49 and that nonviolent tactics are employed primarily 
by weak groups that lack the capacity to use violence.50 Both claims are misleading. Direct action 
and mobilization are unlikely absent motives, and nonviolence is a more likely tactic for stronger 
movements, with wider support, which can mobilize more effectively using this tactic than through 
violence. Violent tactics instead will often be an adaptation to limited mobilization potential and poor 
prospects for effective nonviolent mobilization. Our comparative focus on strategic choice and how 
these are rooted in actor profiles provides new insights into why different types of groups employ 
the tactics they do. Comparing campaign outcomes by tactics can be misleading if we do not account 
for expected numbers and how actor characteristics shape tactics.  
Our model of the technology of conflict and likely mobilization potential helps understand the 
relationship between factors affecting the choice of tactics and prospects for success. A non-sectarian 
group challenging a dictatorship with a comparatively high resource base and a larger audience for 
mobilization has a comparative advantage in nonviolent tactics and can have better prospects for 
success. A secessionist group with peripheral rural base faces an uphill challenge and is unlikely to 
improve its prospects for success by shifting to nonviolence. The initial choice of violence versus 
nonviolence must be considered in light of group characteristics or strategic context, and movements 
will choose the tactic that gives them the greatest chance of affecting change. Observed nonviolent 
campaigns may on average see a higher success rate than violent campaigns, but only rarely can 
ongoing violent campaigns increase their likelihood of success by shifting unilaterally to a nonviolent 
strategy, and a nonviolent movement is unlikely to become “more effective” by turning to violence.  
                                                 
49 E.g., Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009). 
50 E.g., Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2018). 
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Our study suggests a number of promising avenues for further research. First, the basic modeling 
framework for choice of tactics in conflicts can be extended in several ways. For example, the state 
as an independent actor deserves closer attention. States can repress and make various efforts to deter 
or minimize active mobilization,51 which in turn shapes mobilization potential. States may encourage 
a shift to violence if participation is successfully deterred. States can also try to discourage 
mobilization by accommodation or offer deals to make a sufficiently large share of the population 
step away from participating in active dissident.52 Second, movements can innovate and try to 
improve their prospects. Successful framing, training, as well as dissemination can increase support, 
and generate a nonviolent mobilization advantage. The observed diffusion in nonviolent campaigns 
and apparent tactical learning is consistent with this.53 Finally, event data can provide more 
information on the choices of actors and types of actions, beyond the campaign thresholds used here, 
with more refined measures of nonviolent and violent events. Looking at acts of disorganized 
violence such as riot and attacks on police can allow us to consider to what extent violence crowds 
out nonviolence or arise in response to low participation. Still, our model and analysis here 
demonstrate the fundamental importance of movement characteristics and ability to garner support 
in examining tactics and strategies in political dissent and mobilization. 
 
                                                 
51 E.g., Danneman and Ritter (2014). 
52  E.g., Koos (2016). 
53 E.g., Gleditsch and Rivera (2017). 
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Appendix 
 
 
Shifts in predominant method of resistance, NAVCO 2.0 
Table A1 list all campaigns with apparent shifts in independent states in the NAVCO 2.0 data. Some 
reflect new organizations emerging rather than an existing organization or leadership changing 
tactics. For example, NAVCO records a switch in Kosovo from nonviolence to violence as the 
primary tactic in 1998 when the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) launches a violent campaign. But 
the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) leading the prior nonviolent movement did not change 
strategy or disappear when the KLA emerged. The basis for determining what constitutes “primary” 
tactics here and elsewhere in these data is not fully clear. Other shifts such as South Africa appear to 
arise due to changes in the external context. For example, both the African National Congress and 
the Government explicitly acknowledge changing tactics in response to the end of the Cold War, see 
https://tinyurl.com/yd9p8y3s (pp.160-9) and https://tinyurl.com/ydda4xpm. The NAVCO data have 
no minimum threshold for violence, and in some cases record shifts to residual violence without 
significant deaths after the end of a nonviolent campaign, as in Guyana 1991. This makes the low 
share of shifts to violence even more remarkable. 
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Table A1: Shifts in Predominant Method of Resistance, NAVCO 2.0 
 
Country Campaign Years Shift Year Change 
 
Algeria Islamic Salvation Front 1992-2006 1992 NV →  V 
 
Chile Anti-Pinochet Movement 1983-1989 1983 NV →  V 
1984 V  → NV 
 
Colombia Liberals of 1949 1946-1953 1947 NV →  V 
El Salvador Salvadoran Civil Conflict 1977-1991 1979 NV →  V 
1962 V  → NV 
   Guatemala     Marxist rebels (URNG) 1961-1996    1964 NV →  V 
    1995 V  → NV 
 
Guyana Anti-Burnham / Hoyte 1990-1992 1991 NV →  V 
 
India (Nagaland) Naga Rebellion 1955-1975 1957 V  → NV 
1959 NV →  V 
 
 
Indonesia (East Timor)  Freitilin  1974-1978 1974 NV →  V 
Timorese Resistance 1988-1999 1988 V  → NV 
 
Indonesia (West Papua) West Papua Anti-Occuption 1964-2006 2000 NV →   V 
 
Indonesia Indonesian leftists / Anti Sukarno  1956-1960 1957 NV →   V 
1958 V    → NV 
 
Israel (Palestinian Territories)   Palestinian Liberation 1973-2006 1986 V    → NV 
1993 NV →   V 
 
Morocco (Western Sahara) POLISARIO 1975-1991 1981 V    → NV 
1983 NV →   V 
 
Nepal CPN-M/UPF 1996-2006 2005 V    → NV 
Papua New Guinea Bougainville Revolt 1989-1998 1997 V    → NV 
Philippines Moro National Liberation Front 1970-1980 1975 V    → NV 
1976 NV →   V 
 
Romania Anti-Ceaucescu 1987-1989 1988 NV →   V 
 
Russia Chechen Separatists 1994-2006 1996 V    → NV 
1997 NV →   V 
 
South Africa  First Defiance Campaign 1952-1961 1959 NV →   V 
Second Defiance Campaign 1984-1994 1989 V    → NV 
 
Sri Lanka LTTE  1972-2006 1975 NV →   V 
 
1968 NV →   V 
 
UK (Northern Ireland) IRA  1968-2006 
1993 V    → NV 
1995 NV →   V 
1998 V    → NV 
 
Yugoslavia (Kosovo) Kosovo Albanian 1989-1999 1996 NV →   V 
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General proof for nonviolent mobilization advantage 
In this section we provide a general proof for nonviolent mobilization advantage. We demonstrate 
that there will exist a level of mobilization where the probability of success is higher with a 
nonviolent strategy than a violent strategy, provided that the probability of success rises with greater 
numbers of people mobilized and a critical level of mobilization using nonviolence that sufficiently 
exceeds the maximum mobilization possible when relying on a violent strategy. To simplify the 
proof, we reverse the scaling in Figure 2 in terms of π = 1 − p, where higher values of π indicate a 
higher probability of dissident victory relative to the government. 
 
Proof 
Assume the probability that the dissidents win is a function of the tactics (n or v; nonviolent and 
violent) and the number of people mobilized, m. We write the probability of winning with tactic t 
and people m, πt(m). Further, we assume the number of people mobilized is also a function of the 
tactic and some general “size of audience” a : mt(a). 
 We further assume that both πt’s are increasing in m, and for a fixed m, πv (m) > πn(m), i.e., 
more active participants means a higher chance of success, and for a fixed number of participants, 
violence is most effective. It is also reasonable to assume that both mt’s are (weakly) increasing, and 
that for any size of audience a, mn(a) > mv (a): that is to say, a nonviolent movement can have more 
active participants than a violent movement. 
A movement will choose nonviolent tactics if πn(mn(a)) > πv (mv (a)). Given the above 
assumptions, a movement will choose nonviolent or violent tactics, depending on whether the (a) 
“violence is more effective for fixed m” or (b) the “more m with nonviolence” effect is larger. The 
change in the chance of winning with tactic t as the audience increases is: 
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∂πt ∂πt(m) ∂mt(a) 
= 
 
. (1) 
∂a ∂m  ∂a 
 
 
By the above assumptions, both terms are (weakly) positive, so the probability of winning with 
either tactic is (weakly) increasing in the audience. 
Implicit in our argument is that a larger audience increases potential active mobilization in 
terms of mn (nonviolent tactics), but to a lesser extent with respect to mv (violent tactics). Given 
this, as the size of audience increases, the probability of success with nonviolent tactics, πn(mn(a)), 
increases while the probability of success with violent tactics, πv (mv (a)), does not increase as 
much, and so the relative appeal of nonviolent tactics increases. Moreover, if the rate of this 
increase does not approach zero, then as m rises, nonviolent tactics will eventually be superior. 
More generally, if: 
 
∂πn(m) ∂mn(a) ∂πv (m) ∂mv (a) 
> 
 
. (2) 
∂m ∂a ∂m  ∂a 
 
 
This difference never approaches zero; thus for sufficiently large enough audiences nonviolent 
tactics will be better. 
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i 
Mobilization advantage and costs 
 
In this section we provide a simple illustration of how a mobilization advantage could arise from 
differences in costs of conflict. The left panel in Figure 9 summarizes costs to the government Cj 
increasing with mobilization and tactic, while the right panel reflects the costs for dissidents Ci 
decreasing with m. For example, a small violent insurgency with low m may impose more substantial 
costs Cj on the government than a non-cooperation campaign with low participation, but the relative 
cost advantage of violent campaigns diminishes as m increases. Provided the costs to a government 
Cj increase with mobilization at different rates, then nonviolence may impose higher costs if 𝑚  
is sufficiently greater than 𝑚 . 
 
Figure 9: Costs by mobilization m and tactic for the government (left) and to dissidents (right) 
 
 
 
 
 
  (a) government     (b) dissident group 
 
 
The total costs to dissidents Ci can also differ by tactics, for example if their vulnerability to 
government repression differs by maximum individual mobilization m. The total costs for 
participants in nonviolent dissent C n are high when participation m is low. However, there is an  
6 
important safety-in-numbers effect as the likelihood of an individual being targeted declines with 
the numbers mobilized m, and more difficult for the government to retaliate against large 
movements (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Nepstad, 2011, 2013). Provided the costs to 
dissidents increase with mobilization at different rates, nonviolence may be less costly to 
dissidents if 𝑚  is sufficiently greater than 𝑚 . 
 
  
7 
Territorial nonviolent  campaigns 
The NAVCO data only records 13 territorial nonviolent campaigns in sovereign states, not 
including campaigns in colonies. Two campaigns coded as territorial and responses to foreign 
occupation—Czechoslovakia 1968 and Hungary 1956 following interventions by USSR— could 
arguably be considered anti-government. Five of the other cases take place in the former Soviet 
Union or Yugoslavia at the end of the Cold War. Note that the NAVCO data do not include many 
prominent secessionist movements such as Catalonia, Quebec, and Scotland, where movements 
rely on conventional political participation rather than direct action. 
 
 
Table A2: Territorial nonviolent Campaigns 
 
Campaign Group 
 
 
Country 
 
Name Year Target Goal 
 
Total Pop†  
 
Pop† Size 
Czechoslovakia Czech Anti-Soviet Occupation 1968 Soviet Occupation Anti-Occupation 14361  8976 0.63 
Czechoslovakia (Slovakia) Public Against Violence 1989 Czech Communist Government Territorial Secession 15638  4817 0.31 
China (Tibet) Tibetan Uprising 1987 Chinese Occupation Anti-Occupation 1104193  5079 0.005 
Hungary Hungary Anti-Soviet Occupation 1956 Soviet Occupation Anti-Occupation 9911  8920 0.9 
Indonesia (East Timor) Freitilin 1974 Indonesian Occupation Anti-Occupation 127545  6377 0.05 
Israel (Golan Heights) Druze Resistance 1982 Israeli Occupation of Golan Greater Autonomy 4027  20 0.005 
Nigeria (Ogoni) Ogoni Movement 1990 Nigerian Gov. & Corp. Exploitation Greater Autonomy 96154  481 0.005 
UK (Northern Ireland) IRA 1968 British Occupation Anti-Occupation 55214  663 0.012 
USSR (Estonia) Singing Revolution 1987 Communist Regime Greater Autonomy 282830  1414 0.005 
USSR (Georgia) Gamsakhurdia & Abkhazia 1989 Georgian Occupation Territorial Secession 287630  4803 0.01 
USSR (Latvia) Latvia Pro-Democracy Movmt. 1989 Communist Regime Territorial Secession 287630  1726 0.006 
USSR (Lithuania) Sajudis- Lithuanian Pro-Dem. Movmt. 1989 Lithuanian Regime Territorial Secession 287630  2876 0.01 
Yugoslavia (Kosovo) Kosovo Albanian Nationalist Movmt. 1981 Yugoslav Government Greater Autonomy 22471  2023 0.09 
Yugoslavia (Kosovo) Kosovo Albanian 1989 Serbian rule Greater Autonomy 23695  2133 0.09 
Yugoslavia (Slovenia) Slovenia Anti-Communist 1989 Communist Regime Regime Change 23695  1896 0.08 
Yugoslavia (Slovenia) Slovenian Independence 1990 Yugoslav Government Territorial Secession 23818  1905 0.08 
†Population in thousands. Source: NAVCO 2.0 campaign data, population data from the World Bank, 
group share data from EPR. Population values for Tibet from Hao (2000) and Golan heights estimate from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-14724844. 
